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To understand object categorization, participants are tested in experiments often quite
different from how people experience object categories in the real world. Learning and
knowledge of categories is measured in discrete experimental trials, those trials may or
may not provide feedback, trials appear one after another, after some ﬁxed inter-trial interval,
with hundreds of trials in a row, within experimental blocks with some structure dictated
by the experimental design. In the real world, outside of certain educational and vocational
contexts, opportunities to learn and use categories are intermixed over time with a whole
multitude of intervening experiences. It is clear from any elementary understanding of
human cognition that sequential effects matter, yet this understanding is often ignored,
and categorization trials are often instead treated as independent events, immune to local
trial context. In this perspective, we use some of our work to illustrate some of the
consequences of the fact that categorization experiments have a particular trial structure.
Experimental trial context can affect performance in category learning and categorization
experiments in ways that can profoundly affect theoretical conclusions.
Keywords: categorization, category learning, context, basic-level, experimental design
INTRODUCTION
We need to be able to recognize objects in the world as kinds of
things because we rarely see the exact same object twice. Kinds of
things are called categories. On a hike in the woods, if we see a
large brown creature, we need to know whether we should start
slowly backing away or pull out our camera and snap a picture. If
we see a tasty-looking mushroom at the base of a tree, we need to
know if eating it might send us to the hospital. If we see a person
walking toward us along the trail, we need to know if it is a friend
or a stranger. These decisions all require categories.
On our hike, in one moment we might categorize the small
creature in the tree before us as an Indigo bunting, then in the
next moment notice that the tree itself is some kind of oak, not
knowing the particular variety. Our friend suggests that it might
be a Black oak. We then see a disgusting black insect with a vicious
“tail” on a leaf in some foliage at the base of the tree. The park
ranger leading the hike tells us that this is a kind of Ichneu-
mon wasp, and thankfully notes that its extremely long ovipositor
is not used for stinging but for laying its eggs in rotten trees.
Telling birds from trees from bushes from bugs is categorization.
Telling apart our friend from the park ranger is categorization.
In a few moments of experience, many different categorizations
of different objects at different levels of abstraction happen, with
opportunities to learn a new kind of tree and a new kind of insect
thrown in.
Laboratory experiments are far more structured. Consider a
fairly typical category learning experiment (Richler and Palmeri,
2014). A small collection of novel objects – they could be ran-
dom dot patterns (Posner and Keele, 1968), novel shapes (Op
de Beeck et al., 2001), cartoon animals (Folstein et al., 2010), and
so forth – are created and participants must learn what category
each object belongs in. On every category learning trial, a sin-
gle object is presented, the participant responds with a category
label, corrective feedback is provided, and then after some brief
delay, the next trial begins. Sometimes participants are tested on
old trained objects and new transfer objects without feedback,
sometimes at the end of learning and sometimes over the course
of learning (Johansen and Palmeri, 2002). In nearly every cate-
gory learning experiment, participants are tested on a collection
of objects from a small number of categories, trial after trial after
trial for 100s, sometimes 1000s, of trials at a stretch. While there
may be certain educational and vocational contexts where people
repeatedly perform the same categorizations on the same set of
objects repeatedly, over and over again, this is clearly not like our
hike in the woods.
Are there consequences of doing the same categorizations from
one trial to the next in an experiment? Sometimes work aims pre-
cisely to understand sequential effects (e.g., Nelson et al., 2010),
perhaps to investigate constructs like priming (e.g., McNamara,
2004) or task switching (e.g., Monsell, 2003). And important work
in categorization aims to explore the role of sequential effects (e.g.,
Jones and Sieck, 2003; Jones et al., 2006) and how explicit varia-
tion to trial context can inﬂuence how categories are learned (e.g.,
Elio and Anderson, 1984; Mathy and Feldman, 2009; Pashler and
Mozer, 2013; Carvalho and Goldstone, 2014a,b). But outside of
work explicitly aimed at measuring or manipulating trial con-
text, sequential effects, and the particulars of experimental trial
structure are often ignored completely. Or they are acknowledged
grudgingly, perhaps in the same vein as things like general fatigue
effects, something that surely affects performance in experiments,
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but in theoretically uninteresting ways. Now, whereas constructs
like sequential effects, priming, and task switching are deﬁned as
changes that occur from one trial to the next, a construct like
categorization must exist outside of a particular trial context. By
this we mean that while categorization can certainly be inﬂuenced
by local context, some aspect of our ability to categorize object
should be independent of that context. So we need to recognize
when some of the effects we observe about categorization are sen-
sitive to trial context, especially since in the real world, particular
categorizations need not be performed one after another, like they
typically are in an experiment.
In this brief perspective, we illustrate previously unrecognized
effects of trial context during category learning of novel objects,
during category transfer after learning novel objects, and during
categorization of knownobjects. In each case, a focus on particular
experimental design details, particularly related to experimental
trial context, will prove critical for a theoretical understanding of
categorization (see also Richler and Palmeri, 2014). We focus here
on some of our own work, but reference related work from other
groups. In contrast to work that explicitly measures sequential
effects or manipulates trial context, here examine the theoretical
consequence of ignoring those effects entirely.
CATEGORIZATION BY RELATIVE JUDGMENT
Consider the simple case of 10 objects that vary along a sin-
gle dimension psychological continuum (e.g., size, brightness, or
frequency):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A A A A A B B B B B
The ﬁrst ﬁve objects are assigned to category A, the second ﬁve
to category B (adapted from Stewart et al., 2002). Imagine we are
partway through a category learning experiment. A participant
is shown object 3 and asked what category it belongs to. Most
theories of categorization would say that the object is compared to
some internal representation of learned category knowledge that
is stored in long-term memory (Palmeri and Tarr, 2008), which
could be something like prototypes (e.g., Smith and Minda, 1998),
exemplars (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986), or a decision rule (e.g., Ashby
and Gott, 1988).
An alternative strategy does not rely on long-term memory at
all, but on a relative judgment strategy based on recently experi-
enced information in working memory, perhaps just the previous
category learning trial in fact. On the trial right before object 3 was
shown, the participant was shown some other object. Suppose it
was object 10. They responded with category A or category B, and
were then given feedback that object 10 is a member of category B.
Instead of relying on a long-term category representation to cate-
gorize object 3, the participant could simply note that object 3 is
very different from object 10, so it likely belongs in the other cat-
egory, and responds, correctly, that it is a member of category A.
Now if the previous object was instead object 2 and the partici-
pant was told that it belongs in category A, well, object 3 is very
similar to object 2, so perhaps it also belongs to category A, which
it does. For objects far from the category boundary, this rela-
tive judgment strategy will work quite well, whereas for objects
close to the category boundary, it will work quite poorly, but
that predicted performance maps well onto the performance you
might see in an experiment. Although this strategywill not capture
asymptotic levels of performance, when participants are perfect at
categorizing all objects along the continuum, this strategy does
predict fairly clear sequential effects, which in fact are observed
in categorization (Stewart et al., 2002; Stewart and Brown, 2004;
see also Carvalho and Goldstone, 2014b). And a variant of this
relative judgment strategy can also account for performance in
absolute identiﬁcation (Stewart et al., 2005; but see Brown et al.,
2007).
Are there broader theoretical consequences of participants
using a simple relative judgment strategy of comparing the cur-
rent object with the previous object and using its feedback?
Imagine that, unbeknownst to the experimenter, this is pre-
cisely the strategy that participants use, without creating any
long-term memory representations of categories. But imagine
that the experimenter only considers that participant perfor-
mance is based on forming long-term representations. Palmeri
and Flanery (2001) simulated performance of participants using
the simple relative judgment strategy for a sample of category
structures (from Smith et al., 1997; Smith and Minda, 1998).
They ﬁrst asked whether the strategy was viable; would simu-
lated participants perform greater than chance. They next asked
whether that performance, which depends on only on a simple
relative judgment strategy, would look more like performance pre-
dicted by a prototype abstraction model or an exemplar storage
model, which both depend on long-term memory representa-
tions.
Rather than train people on objects that varied along a sin-
gle dimension, Smith et al. (1997) trained people on objects
that varied along multiple binary-valued dimensions. To illus-
trate, imagine that each category instance was deﬁned by four
dimensions that could each take on one of two values, designated
abstractly as 0 for one value and 1 for the other value along a
dimension. And imagine that category A members are 0 0 0 0,
0 0 0 1, 0 0 1 0, 0 1 0 0, and 1 0 0 0 and that category B members
are the complement, 1 1 1 1, 1 1 1 0, 1 1 0 1, 1 0 1 1, and 0 1 1 1.
At some point during learning, if you were to see item 1 1 1 0 and
if the previous item was 0 0 1 0, labeled category A, it would be
trivial to guess that 1 1 1 0 was in category B.
Palmeri and Flanery (2001) simulated predicted categoriza-
tion behavior using this simple strategy over 14 different category
learning problems reported by Smith et al. (1997) and Smith and
Minda (1998). Not every category learning problem studied by
Smith, or by others, can utilize this simple strategy; some kind of
true long-term category learning is required in those cases. But
for every category learning problem where Palmeri and Flanery
(2001) reported that the simple strategy produced above chance
categorization performance, Smith et al. (1997) had reported evi-
dence for prototype abstraction over exemplar storage. Moreover,
category learning performance that Palmeri and Flanery (2001)
simulated using the simple strategy was better ﬁtted by a proto-
type model than an exemplar model. Of course, performance was
not based on prototypes in any of these cases, it was based only on
memory for the previous trial. Behavior that seems to indicate the
creation of particular kinds of long-term category representations
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can instead reﬂect strategies that are only possible because category
learning experiments have a particular experimental trial context.
CATEGORY LEARNING DURING CATEGORY TESTING
Our next example also comes from theoretical work contrasting
exemplars and prototypes, speciﬁcally work that associates exem-
plars with an explicit declarative memory system and prototype
abstraction with an implicit learning system (Squire and Zola,
1996). One well-known demonstration of a behavioral dissoci-
ation between the two, tested amnesic individuals and controls
on category learning and recognition memory with a variant of
the classic dot pattern task (Knowlton and Squire, 1993; Squire
and Knowlton, 1995). After studying a small set of random dot
patterns (Posner and Keele, 1968), amnesic individuals were sig-
niﬁcantly impaired compared to controls at discriminating studied
dot patterns from new dot patterns in a recognition memory test.
However, after studying a set of distortions of a prototype dot
pattern, there was no signiﬁcant difference between amnesic indi-
viduals and controls in their ability to categorize members versus
non-members at test. By itself, a signiﬁcantly larger impairment
at recognition memory compared to categorization is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with predictions of exemplar models (Nosofsky
and Zaki, 1998). However, observing chance recognition mem-
ory with above chance categorization (Squire and Knowlton,
1995) is more theoretically challenging (Palmeri and Flanery,
2002).
But, here again is a case where it is important to closely examine
the experimental trial context. For the recognition memory task,
individuals studied ﬁve entirely random dot patterns that were
presented eight times each. Then, they were tested on those ﬁve
studied patterns and ﬁve new random patterns. Without memory
for studied dot patterns, there is simply no way to discriminate
old from new patterns. For the categorization task, individuals
studied forty high-level distortions of a single category prototype.
At test, they were shown four repetitions of the previously unseen
prototype, 20 low-level distortions, 20 high-level distortions, and
40 completely new random patterns, and were asked to discrim-
inate studied category members from non-members. While no
feedback was provided in the categorization test, it is important to
note that during the test subjects were shown many dot patterns
that were very similar to one another and other dot patterns that
were completely dissimilar from one another. Are long-term cate-
gory representations even needed to discriminate members from
non-members at test given the highly structured nature of the test
itself?
Palmeri and Flanery (1999, 2002) conducted experiments
where subjects were told that they had been subliminally shown a
series of dot patterns during an initial unrelated task at the start
of the experimental session. In fact, they had never seen any dot
patterns whatsoever. Nothingwas presented subliminally. Subjects
were then tested on either the recognition memory or categoriza-
tion dot pattern task. Not surprisingly, subjects were completely
at chance at recognizing “old” dot patterns from new dot patterns;
without memory (since no dot patterns had ever been seen before)
there was simply no way to make that discrimination. However,
even without ever having seen any previous distortions of the pro-
totype, subjects were signiﬁcantly above chance at categorization.
In fact, these subjects who studied nothing performed just as well
as subjects who had actually studied dot patterns earlier. Subjects
had learned during the test, and Palmeri and Flanery (1999, 2001)
surmised that this learning could be supported by working mem-
ory for a few recent testing trials, which is spared in amnesia. The
potential for learning during test has since been shown to play
a key role in several other experiments purporting to show dis-
sociations between categorization and recognition memory (Zaki
and Nosofsky, 2001, 2004, 2007; Nosofsky et al., 2012). Seemingly
inconsequential details of the experimental trial context can have
profound theoretical consequences.
HOW BLOCK STRUCTURE AFFECTS CATEGORIZATION
Ourﬁnal example switches gears to examine categorization perfor-
mance with known categories rather than novel category learning.
Most objects are categorized at an intermediate level of abstrac-
tion (e.g., bird) than more superordinate levels (e.g., animal)
or subordinate levels (e.g., Indigo bunting). The so-called basic
level advantage (Rosch et al., 1976) has been a cornerstone ﬁnd-
ing of signiﬁcant work in categorization for many years (Mack
and Palmeri, 2011). One place where the basic-level advantage
is observed is the widely-used category veriﬁcation task, where
on each trial a category label is shown – on some trials it might
be the subordinate level (Indigo bunting), on other trials the
basic level (bird), and on other trials the superordinate level
(animal) – then an object is shown and participants must ver-
ify whether the objects is a member of the target category or
not as quickly and accurately as possible. For novice categories,
basic-level category veriﬁcations are made signiﬁcantly faster than
subordinate or superordinate categorizations (cf., Tanaka and
Taylor, 1991).
The basic-level advantage is likely familiar to anyone who has
taken an introductory cognitive psychology class as an under-
graduate. But, a different story emerges when the test image
is shown with limited exposure duration. During an ultra-
rapid categorization task, when images are shown for 30 ms
or less, superordinate categorization is observed to be signiﬁ-
cantly faster than basic or subordinate categorization (Thorpe
et al., 1996; Fabrè-Thorpe, 2011). Whether the basic level or
superordinate level is prior, and why, has important theoretical
implications. For Rosch et al. (1976) the basic-level carves nature
at its joints. While for Thorpe et al. (1996) the superordinate
level represents the initial feed-forward sweep through the visual
system.
Most contrasts between speeded category veriﬁcation (á la
Rosch et al., 1976) and ultra-rapid categorization (á la Thorpe
et al., 1996) have largely focused on the salient difference in expo-
sure duration. But, with closer examination, it becomes clear
that these tasks differ as well in their experimental trial context.
Ultra-rapid categorization tasks block category context, testing
participants on a single categorization at a single level of abstrac-
tion for hundreds of trials. Speeded category veriﬁcation tasks,
by contrast, mix categorizations at different levels of abstraction
from trial to trial. When comparing across the two kinds of tasks,
exposure duration and category context are confounded. Mack
and Palmeri (under review) broke this confound, systematically
investigating how both factors, exposure duration and category
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context, affect the relative speed of categorizations at different lev-
els of abstraction. Of course, one possibility is that deconfounding
exposure duration and category context might reveal that only
exposure duration affected categorization. But that is not what we
observed.
The basic-level advantage was eliminated only when stimu-
lus exposure duration was brief and target category context was
blocked. When exposure duration was brief and target cate-
gory context was mixed, with categorization at different levels
of abstraction from trial to trial, the ubiquitous basic-level advan-
tage was preserved. Furthermore, within a mixed block of trials,
when categorizations at a given level of abstraction happened to
repeat over several trials, the basic-level advantage gave way to a
growing superordinate advantage. This novel ﬁnding presents a
challenge to extant theories, and space precludes a complete dis-
cussion (see Mack and Palmeri, under review). What is clear is that
whether or not there is observed a superordinate advantage with
brief exposure seems to depend critically on experimental trial
context. Experimenters ignoring trial context do so at their peril.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The only thing worse than a language maven is a statistics maven –
and the only thing worse than a statistics maven is a meth-
ods maven. Every experimental psychologist knows it is folly
to treat experimental trials as independent from one another.
Sequential effects are ever-present, and may be key to theoret-
ical understanding (e.g., Jones et al., 2013; Jones, 2014). Here
we have roused the methods maven to highlight how experi-
mental trial context can profoundly inﬂuence category learning
and categorization behavior. These are not simply quantitative
differences, but qualitative inﬂuences with potentially profound
theoretical implications. Oddly, while signiﬁcant work cited ear-
lier has demonstrated sequential effects or has manipulated trial
context, work not focused on measuring or manipulating trial
context has too often implicitly assumed no systematic inﬂuence
of trial context on categorization.
In the introduction, we highlighted how categorization in the
real world often jumps from one kind of object to another kind of
object, fromone level of abstraction to another level of abstraction.
Our choice of reference to the real world was not intended as a
screed on ecological validity – like Mook (1983), we will defend
external invalidity to our dying day. Instead it was to highlight that,
unlike a domain like task switching, where the real world analog
is just that, switching from one task to another, in categorization,
sometimes we follow up one categorization with another of the
same sort, but often we do not. Our experiments and theories
need to explain one-shot categorization. And to the extent that
categorization behavior is sensitive to experimental trial context,
we need to know when, how, and why.
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